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Abstract: This paper addresses the problem of using monitoring for keep-
ing track of user activity within a large-scale distributed storage system. We
focus on the case of BlobSeer, a system designed to store massive data, while
leveraging a large-scale deployment and heavy data-access concurrency. We
discuss the useful data that should be collected by the monitoring tools in or-
der to present the user with a detailed and meaningful image of the storage
system and of the data inside. We propose a distributed architecture for stor-
ing and processing the received data. Moreover, we analyze the types of pro-
tocol breaches that are specific to BlobSeer and we propose a mechanism that
identifies the malicious users who attempt this kind of attacks. We implement
our solution as a new BlobSeer component that does not interfere with its effi-
cient data-access primitives, but instead it builds on the user-activity history to
obtain real-time information about the users in the system and possibly block
those with malicious intentions.
Key-words: Distributed system, storage management, large-scale system, ma-
licious users detection, monitoring
Surveillance des utilisateurs à travers un système de
monitoring reparti pour la plate-forme de gestion
des données BlobSeer
Résumé : Ce rapport étudie la possibilité d’utiliser des outils de surveillance
pour suivre l’activité des utilisateurs dans le cadre d’un système de stockage
de données reparties à grande échelle. Nous nous concentrons sur BlobSeer,
un système conçu pour la gestion de très grandes données qui permet un ac-
cès très performant aux données. Nous présentons les informations qui peu-
vent être utilement recueillies par les systèmes de monitoring pour exposer à
l’utilisateur une image détaillée du système et des données qui y sont stockées.
Nous proposons une architecture distribuée pour stocker et traiter les in-
formations reçues. De plus, nous analysons les types des violations des pro-
tocoles d’accès aux données qui sont spécifiques à BlobSeer et nous proposons
un mécanisme pour identifier les utilisateurs malveillants qui tentent ce genre
d’attaques. Nous avons implémenté notre solution sous la forme d’un nou-
veau module BlobSeer qui n’interfère pas avec ses primitives efficaces d’accès
aux données. Il s’appuie sur l’histoire de l’activité des utilisateurs pour obtenir
en temps réel des informations sur eux et éventuellement bloquer les utilisa-
teurs malveillants.
Mots-clés : Système reparti, gestion des données, large échelle, détéction des
utilisateurs malveillants,surveillance
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1 Introduction
1.1 Context
Cloud computing [6], [18] is an emerging paradigm that is becoming increas-
ingly popular in both industry and scientific communities. It promotes a new
and innovative concept in managing hardware and software resources: instead
of buying andmaintaining them, users can rent virtual machines, storage space
or already deployed software platforms. Cloud services have been proposed
by leading industry companies, such as Amazon [15], Yahoo, IBM, Google [16]
or Microsoft [17], which have strongly promoted the concept during the last
years. In addition to those, the academic communities are also becoming in-
terested in this topic. There are open-source projects, such as Nimbus [11] or
Eucalyptus [10], that aim at providing a Cloud computing framework with the
help of virtualization to members of scientific societies, for studies on the sub-
ject.
In this context, data management is a key issue. While users are provided
with the ability to store data on remote, virtual resources, the need for mecha-
nisms able to provide feedback about the state of the system becomes obvious.
Monitoring its condition and activity can provide significant progress in areas
such as efficient management of resources, performance, quality of service or
security [7].
Client monitoring is important in ensuring that the terms of usage stipu-
lated by the provider are being respected. The storage service has to be aware
of its different client types, each with specific privilege levels, access rights or
quality of service requirements [20]. When policy violations are detected, the
system needs to enforce adaptive security rules.
These objectives could be reached by developing a system that continually
analyzes the user activity andmonitors the general state of the system, in order
to determine abnormal activity or potential insecure events happening within.
1.2 Motivation
This work addresses how monitoring can be used in keeping track of user ac-
tivity inside a cloud storage system. It discusses the useful data that should be
collected by the monitoring tools in order to present the user with a detailed
and meaningful image of the storage system and of the data inside. A key
point is to identify how the data must be processed in order to obtain a real-
time image of the integrity of data within the system and of the users creating
it.
As a case study, we use the BlobSeer [8] distributed storage system as a
framework for our work. BlobSeer is a large-scale data-sharing system, which
aims to efficiently manage the storage of large and unstructured binary data
blocks.
We also have to consider the monitoring challenges raised by a large-scale
storage system, such as the large number of nodes, the fine-grained striping of
the data over the storage nodes and the heavy concurrent access to data. The
MonALISA system [5] is a monitoring framework designed as an ensemble of
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autonomous subsystems which are registered as dynamic services and cooper-
ate in performing a wide range of information gathering and processing tasks.
It is a system able to meet our challenges, and a user accounting system for
BlobSeer can rely on it for gathering the required information.
Our work is based on some previous research addressing how monitoring
can be used in keeping track of user activity inside BlobSeer: a 3-layered ar-
chitecture has been designed in order to bring introspection capabilities within
the system. Data is indexed based on the BLOB it refers and collected inside a
centralized storage, where it can be consulted in order to view or extract infor-
mation.
Using this work as a starting point, we have designed our own monitoring
system, fine tuned for gathering and interpreting information about the users
of BlobSeer. What we propose in addition to earlier work is a distributed ar-
chitecture for storing and processing the received data, and also a module that
uses the results obtained to compute a list of what we call malicious clients.
2 Background knowledge
2.1 BlobSeer
BlobSeer is a data-sharing system that manages the storage of large and un-
structured data blocks called binary large objects, referred to as BLOBs fur-
ther in this report. It is developed inside the KerData Project-Team, at IRISA,
France, and hosted at blobseer.gforge.inria.fr.
BlobSeer addresses the problem of efficiently storing massive BLOBs in
large scale distributed environments. The BLOBs are striped into small chunks
that have the same size, called pages. It provides an efficient fine-grained ac-
cess to the pages belonging to each BLOB, as well as the possibility to modify
them, in a distributed, multi-user environment.
The system consists of distributed processes that communicate through re-
mote procedure calls (RPCs). A physical node can run one or more processes
and, at the same time, may play multiple roles from the ones mentioned below.
Clients. Clients may issue CREATE, WRITE, APPEND and READ requests.
Their number dynamically varies in time without notifying the system.
There can be many concurrent clients accessing the same BLOB or dif-
ferent BLOBs in the same time. The support for concurrent operations is
enhanced by storing the pages belonging to the same BLOB on multiple
storage providers.
Data providers. Data providers physically store and manage the pages gener-
ated by WRITE and APPEND requests. New data providers are free to
join and leave the system in a dynamic way.
The provider manager. The provider manager keeps information about the
available data providers. When entering the system, each new join-
ing provider registers with the provider manager. The provider man-
ager tells the client to store the generated pages in the appropriate data
providers according to a strategy aiming at global load balancing.
RR n° 7436
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Figure 1: BlobSeer Architecture
Metadata providers. Metadata providers physically store the metadata, al-
lowing clients to find the pages corresponding to the various BLOB ver-
sions. Metadata providers may be distributed to allow an efficient con-
current access to metadata.
The version manager. The version manager is the key actor of the system. It
registers update requests (APPEND and WRITE), assigning BLOB ver-
sion numbers to each of them. The versionmanager eventually publishes
these updates, guaranteeing total ordering and atomicity.
For each BLOB, themetadata is organized as a distributed segment tree [21],
where each node corresponds to a version and to a page range within that ver-
sion. Each leaf covers just one page, recording the information about the data
provider where the page is physically stored. The metadata trees are stored on
the metadata providers, which are processes organized as a distributed hash
table [12].
BlobSeer provides versioning support, so as to prevent pages from being
overwritten and to be able to handle highly concurrent WRITE and APPEND
operations. For each of them, only a patch composed of the range of written
pages is added to the system, and a new metadata tree is created. The new
metadata tree corresponds to a new version and points to the newly added
pages and to the pages from the previous versions that were not overlapped
by the added page range.
The interactions between the entities of BlobSeer are briefly illustrated in
Figure 2.
For a WRITE request, the client contacts the provider manager to obtain a
list of providers, one for each page of the BLOB segment that needs to be writ-
ten. Then, the client contacts the providers in the list in parallel and requests
them to store the pages. Each provider executes the request and sends an ac-
knowledgment to the client. When the client has received all the acknowledg-
ments, it contacts the version manager, requesting a new version number. This
version number is then used by the client to generate the corresponding new
metadata. After receiving the acknowledgment, the client reports the success
to the version manager.
A READ request begins with the client contacting the version manager to
get the version of the corresponding BLOB. If the specified version is available
RR n° 7436
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Figure 2: Internal interactions inside BlobSeer: READ(left) and WRITE(right)
the client contacts the metadata provider to retrieve the metadata associated
with the pages of the requested segment for the requested version. After gath-
ering all the metadata, the client contacts (in parallel) the data providers that
store the corresponding pages.
As far as this report is concerned, an APPEND operation is only a special
case of WRITE. Therefore, we disregard this aspect in the rest of the paper.
Everything stated about WRITEs is also true for APPENDs, unless explicitly
specified.
A typical setting of the BlobSeer system involves the deployment of a few
hundreds of provider nodes, each of them storing data in the order of GB, and
even tens of GB in the case of the use of the disk storage for each node. This
implies that sizes within the order of TB can be easily reached for the blobs
stored in the system. Furthermore, the typical size for a page within a blob can
be smaller than 1 MB, whence the need to deal with hundreds of thousands of
pages belonging to just one blob.
For this project, we only monitor WRITE operations and we study the im-
pact of clients’ behavior upon the normal functioning of the system.
2.2 MonALISA
BlobSeer is a storage system that deals with massive data, which are striped
into a huge number of pages scattered across numerous storage providers. A
monitoring tool tuned for presenting the state of a system like BlobSeer has
to cope with two major challenges. On one side, it has to accommodate the
immense number of pages that the system comprises once it stores several
BLOBs. On the other side, the monitoring system has to be able to deal with
a huge amount of monitoring information generated when an application ac-
cesses the nodes that make up the storage service. It is the case when multiple
clients simultaneously access various parts of the stored BLOBs, as they gener-
ate a piece of monitoring information for each page accessed on each provider.
MonALISA is suitable for this task, as it is a system designed to run in grid
environments and it proved to be a scalable and reliable system.
The MonALISA (Monitoring Agents in a Large Integrated Services Archi-
tecture) [9] system is a JINI-based [19], scalable framework of distributed ser-
vices, which provides the necessary tools for collecting and processing mon-
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Figure 3: The MonALISA Architecture
itoring information. The system is designed as an ensemble of autonomous
multi- threaded, self-describing agent-based subsystems which are registered
as dynamic services, and are able to collaborate and cooperate in performing
a wide range of information gathering and processing tasks. These agents can
analyze and process the information, in a distributed way, to provide optimiza-
tion decisions in large scale distributed applications. An agent-based architec-
ture provides the ability to invest the system with increasing degrees of intelli-
gence, to reduce complexity and make global systems manageable in real time.
The scalability of the system derives from the use of multithreaded execution
engine to host a variety of loosely coupled self-describing dynamic services or
agents and the ability of each service to register itself and then to be discovered
and used by any other services, or clients that require such information. The
system is designed to easily integrate existingmonitoring tools and procedures
and to provide this information in a dynamic, customized, self describing way
to any other services or clients.
Its architecture is based on four layers of services, as presented in Figure 3.
It complies with the GridMonitoring Architecture (GMA) [14] proposed by the
Global Grid Forum (GGF) [4], which includes three components: consumers,
producers and a directory service.
The first layer corresponds to a network of Lookup Discovery Services that
provide discovery and notification mechanisms for all the other services. The
second layer is composed of MonALISA services, the components that per-
form the data collection tasks. Each MonALISA service is part of a group and
registers itself with a set of Lookup Services, together with several describing
attributes.
The interaction between clients and services is made available through
transparent Proxy services, which represent the third layer in the MonALISA
architecture. Every MonALISA service discovers the Proxy Services by using
the discovery mechanism implemented into the Lookup Services layer, and
permanently keeps a TCP connection with each of them. The top-level layer is
represented by the MonALISA clients, which offer an intuitive graphical inter-
face of the states of the monitored systems. It allows users to subscribe to and
to visualize global parameters gathered from multiple MonALISA services. It
also provides detailed tracking of parameters for any individual MonALISA
service or component in the entire system. Each type of MonALISA client has
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to connect to the layer of Lookup services in order to request access to data
gathered by one or more specified groups of MonALISA services. It is then
transparently connected to the nearest and less loaded proxy service, which
will forward the data that the client has subscribed to, from all the MonALISA
services.
A Monitoring Module within MonALISA is a dynamically loadable unit
which executes a procedure (or runs a script / program or performs SNMP
request) to collect a set of parameters (monitored values) by properly parsing
the output of the procedure. In general a monitoring module is a simple class,
which is using a certain procedure to obtain a set of parameters and report
them in a standard format.
Monitoring Modules can be used for pulling data and in this case it is nec-
essary to execute themwith a predefined frequency (for example a pull module
which queries a web service) or to "install" (it has to run only once) programs
which are sending the monitoring results (via SNMP, UDP or TCP/IP) periodi-
cally back to the Monitoring Service. Allowing to dynamically load these mod-
ules from a (few) centralized sites when they are needed makes much easier to
keep large monitoring systems updated and to provide new functionalities dy-
namically. Users can implement easily any new dedicated modules and use it
the MonALISA framework.
The MonALISA system is a well-suited choice for monitoring a distributed
storage system, thanks to several features that it provides. First of all, it can
monitor both a set of predefined parameters and various user-defined param-
eters. This is due to an application instrumentation library, called ApMon,
which enables any application to send monitoring information to one or more
MonALISA services. The monitoring data is sent as UDP datagram to one or
more hosts running MonALISA services. Applications can periodically report
any type of information the user wants to collect, monitor or use in the Mon-
ALISA framework to trigger alarms or activate decision agents. The ApMon
implementations are provided for 5 programming languages: C, C++, Java,
Perl and Python.
3 Addressing security issues in BlobSeer
3.1 Security issues in BlobSeer
Part of BlobSeer’s efficiency is enabling high concurrency in parallel writes,
on the same or on different providers. Only metadata writes are serialized,
in the case where more clients are writing the same part of a blob simultane-
ously. Although this approach enables performance gain, it also has a security
downside: BlobSeer processes being completely independent of each other, the
system as a whole has no way of knowing whether their actions are always
consistent with each other, and maintain the system’s integrity.
For instance, if the version manager process is killed for some reason, the
provider manager has no way of knowing this, and it will still supply lists
of valid providers to clients, which will write their data to them. Upon com-
pletion of the writing on providers, a client will normally try to contact the
version manager in order to publish a version number for his operation. Since
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the version manager is unreachable, the publish operation will fail and cause
the whole write to fail. Some replication mechanism of the version manager
could be imagined to prevent this from happening. But in any case where the
process could be unresponsive for a while, clients will unwillingly damage the
system by loading up the providers with useless information.
A security issue may be the fact that BlobSeer has no authentication mech-
anism or any way of making distinctions between users. Every one of them
accesses the blobs in the same way. Also, from the storage point of view, blob
access rights are the same for all the users, and each user can access any part
of a given blob. So if a user want to damage the data written into a blob by
someone else, he has the possibility of doing so.
Also, BlobSeer’s code is open source, and therefore anyone can access and
modify it as they like. In the context of using it in a cloud environment, where
BlobSeer is accessed through the client, there is no way of certifying the users.
One could modify the object_handler component, the client’s interface for ac-
cessing BlobSeer, in such a way that what is reported to the version manager is
no longer consistent with what is written to the providers. Further on, we will
refer to this type of malicious users and we will explain how their behavior can
affect the system, and also propose a way for it to be detected in the shortest
time possible.
3.2 Malicious clients
Based on how the code can be modified to create inconsistencies within writes,
we have identified 3 types of such clients:
• WriteNoPublish (WNP) client - it is the client that writes a certain size of
data to one or more providers, but it doesn’t further contact the version
manager to publish a version of what has been written.
• PublishNoWrite (PNW) client - the client that publishes a new version
to the version manager (and writes it into the metadata tree) without ac-
tually writing anything to providers.
• IncorrectWrites (IW) client - a client who writes to providers a different
number of pages than the one it reports to the version manager for ver-
sioning.
WNP client: TheWNP client’s damaging potential is that if many such clients
are running, they will fill up the providers with useless information that no-
body inside the system will ever know exists. Therefore, a lot of storage space
can be wasted as the result of an attack by such clients. In an extreme case, if
all the storage space is filled up, then the providers will have no more room to
store information, and the running BlobSeer service will become unresponsive.
Even so, this type of malicious client is the least dangerous, because it doesn’t
directly affect the functioning of the service’s components, and if neutralized
on time its effects will not be long-term.
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PNW client: On the other hand, the PNW client’s effects are experienced
right away within the system. The metadata tree is constructed in such a way
that each new version of a blob is connected by pointers to the previous ver-
sion. So if a version written by a PNW client will end up in the metadata tree,
and another valid version is then tied to it, a client wanting to read the latest
version of a blobwill end up in the following situation: BlobSeer will try to take
the parts of the blob that were not covered by the last write from the previous
version, the one that doesn’t actually have any blob pages associated to it. At
this point, the client will either read incorrect information, or some operations
may fail within BlobSeer because of invalid pointers. One PNW client affects
not only one version within BlobSeer, but all of the following ones too.
IW client: The IW client has the same effect as the PNW client: introducing
inconsistent information within the system. This affects both the versioning
system and the storage on the providers, as the information written during
and after such a write cannot be properly accessed.
We implemented these clients aswe have suggested earlier, bymodifying the
code of the object_handler of BlobSeer, in the following way: for IW, ensuring
that the number of pages written to a provider is generated randomly, rather
than the one reported. For WNP and PNW we suppressed from the WRITE
operation either the part that writes to providers, or that which writes to the
version manager.
3.3 Our approach: Using BlobSeer monitoring in user activity
history
In order to prevent such attacks or inconsistencies, multiple security strategies
can be envisioned. One solution would be that the version manager checks
with the providers for the validity of a read before publishing, but that would
be a huge performance overhead. TheWRITE operation could also bemodified
to time-out if after a certain number of pages written no version is published.
In order to preserve as much of the initial performance, our approach con-
sists of creating a monitoring system, independent of BlobSeer, which gathers
information about its components and computes a history of user activity in
the system. This can then be used for multiple purposes, including making
some security decisions.
A system using a BlobSeer deployment can have hundreds or thousands of
data providers and lots of clients accessing the data concurrently. Monitoring
the behavior of the system, as well as monitoring the clients, is a challenging
task. In our approach, the versionmanager and each provider sendmonitoring
data to the MonALISA system. This is done by additional monitoring infras-
tructures, for instance, listeners. The monitoring data is collected by the Mon-
ALISA services and then forwarded to a distributed processing system. Our
goal is to run the monitoring system in parallel with BlobSeer and monitor its
clients’ activity in real time. The system will maintain a list of malicious users
updated periodically. This list could be fed back to BlobSeer, more specifically
to the provider manager. In this way, if a malicious client tries to contact the
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provider manager, in order to get a list of providers for a new write, he can
be denied based on his history. On condition that the information comes back
to BlobSeer fast enough, this can be an efficient implementation of a security
policy.
The user history is computed in the following way: once the write opera-
tion is initiated by a client on a provider (typically for one page), this provider
will send to MonALISA information about the page number, page size, the
hostname of the client that initiated the operation and a timestamp. At the
version manager level, information about the client ID, total size of the write,
page size and version number is sent. Actually, because a version number is
not attributed to a write until the end, it cannot be used in the information sent
in real-time by providers. In order to support a connection between the infor-
mation reported by the two entities, a watermark was associated to each write
operation within BlobSeer, watermark that is reported by all of the providers
and by the version manager. It is randomly-generated and its only purpose is
making the connection between the two. After the information reaches Mon-
ALISA, it is forwarded to a custom processing system consisting of several
computing nodes. The number of pages written on the providers by a client is
then compared to the size reported to the version manager (and also checked if
the page sizes correspond). If they match, we consider the write to be a normal
operation and if they don’t, we compare the write sizes and classify it in one of
the 3 malicious clients’ categories.
3.4 Contribution: Architecture of the user accounting module
3.4.1 Related work
One of the first examples of an intrusion detection system is Haystack [13]. It
defined a range of values that were considered normal for each feature and
if a feature fell outside the normal range during a session, the score for the
subject was raised. Considering the features to be independent, a probability
distribution of the scores was calculated and an alarm was raised if the score
was too large. Haystack also maintained a database of user groups and in-
dividual profiles. If a new user had been detected, a new profile based on
restrictions related to group membership was created. One disadvantage of
Haystack was that it was designed to work offline, because of the statistical
analyses it required. Those could not be done on-line because this would have
required high-performance systems. Our distributed monitoring addresses
just the problem of distributing costly processing among nodes. Together with
the filtering of data at theMonALISA level, this allows us to manipulate a large
amount of information in an on-line manner.
Crosbie et al. [3] proposed to apply genetic algorithms to the problem of
intrusion detection. It is a search technique used to find approximate solutions
to optimization and search problems. Such a search converges to a solution
from more than one direction, and it is based on probabilistic rules instead of
deterministic ones. The authors applied multiple agent technology to detect
some network based anomalies, using numerous agents to monitor different
network based parameters. Nevertheless, the disadvantage to this approach is
that it was not fast enough, the training process taking long. This makes for
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one prerequisite that our system does not support, because the monitoring has
to be simultaneous with the functioning of BlobSeer, and it must start at the
same time.
In [1], the authors put forward a distributed architecture with autonomous
agents operating independently of each other in order to monitor security-
related activity within a network. They suggest a scheme of escalating levels
of alertness, and a way to notify other agents on other computers in a network
of attacks so they can take reactive measures. A neural network is supposed
to measure and determine alert threshold values. The progressive increase in
alert levels is costly with respect to detection time, and for a system such as
BlobSeer, a similar approach would not be fast enough. Although this kind
of detection algorithm is more complex, our system requires an almost im-
mediate detection of malicious actions, in order for its functioning not to be
compromised.
3.4.2 Previous work: Bringing introspection to BlobSeer
Our work is based on previous research carried inside the KerData team re-
lated to creating an introspective BlobSeer. In [2], the authors propose a first
prototype of such architecture. It comprises 3 layers aiming at identifying and
generating relevant information related to the state and the behavior of the sys-
tem, as depicted in Figure 4(a). Such information is then expected to serve as
an input to a higher-level self-adaptation engine (currently not implemented
yet). These data are yielded by an (1) introspection layer, which processes the
raw data collected by a (2) monitoring layer. The lowest layer is represented
by the (3) instrumentation code that enables BlobSeer to send monitoring data
to the upper layers.
The data generated by the instrumentation layer are relayed by the mon-
itoring system and finally fed to the introspection layer. The instrumentation
layer is implemented as a component of the monitoring layer. The version
manager and providers are equipped with ApMon listeners, in order to moni-
tor the READ and WRITE operations.
The input for the introspective layer consists of raw data that are extracted
from the running nodes of BlobSeer, collected and then stored, a set of opera-
tions realized within the monitoring layer. The main challenge the monitoring
layer has to cope with is the large number of storage provider nodes and there-
fore the huge number of BLOB pages, versions and huge BLOB sizes. Further-
more, it has to deal with hundreds of clients that concurrently access various
parts of the stored BLOBs, as they generate a piece of monitoring information
for each page accessed on each provider. MonALISA is suitable for this task,
as it is a system designed for large-scale environments and it proved to be both
scalable and reliable.
The introspection layer corresponds to aMonALISA client, theMonALISA
repository. It is the location where the data is stored into a central database and
made available to the introspection layer. At this level, the user can consult
various graphical representations concerning the state and the activity within
the system.
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(a) Architecture of the introspective Blob-
Seer
(b) User accounting architecture within the
introspective BlobSeer
Figure 4: BlobSeer
architecture presented above. As a work in progress, a centralized user
accounting system is being tested on top of the architecture presented above.
The three types of malicious users presented earlier are computed based on the
periodical querying of the repository database. Users with inconsistent activity
are selected and attributed a score. A black list is computed periodically and
made available to clients who request it. The downside in this approach is that
the centralized database is a bottleneck in the functioning of the system, and
that data stored is not structured in the most efficient way for this purpose.
3.4.3 Architecture of the user accounting module
Our work represents an extension of [2]. We have modified the architecture
described above and rewritten the layers, in order to adapt it to a higher degree
of distribution in the processing performed on the data. Our system has the
following layout, presented in Figure 4(b) and has 2 main components:
• The monitoring system, which has 3 layers:
– Instrumentation layer
– Monitoring layer
– Data processing layer
• User accounting module
Such information is then expected to serve as an input to a higher-level
self-adaptation engine, which is to be implemented within BlobSeer, as shown.
The monitoring system is the one handling the collecting and processing of
data related to client activity in BlobSeer. This information can be used
in multiple ways, but our approach uses it for creating a user accounting
system. The second module of our work is one that uses given informa-
tion about users to compute a history for each of the clients, determining
whether they performed malicious actions and how many times.
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The instrumentation layer is the same as the one in Figure 4(a). As we
stated before, we equip each provider with a listener attached to the
WRITE operation, so that when a client performs this operation, in-
formation about the page number, client ID and page size is sent to
MonALISA. On the versionmanager side, similar information about
a new version of a specific blob is sent using a parser that monitors
the events recorded in the logs. The difference between these two
types of listeners is that for one WRITE we have one version man-
ager message to MonALISA, while on the provider side we have
one for every page written. The state of the physical resources on
each node is monitored through an ApMon thread that periodically
sends data to the monitoring service.
The monitoring layer is represented by MonALISA and the actions
taken at this level about the data collected. We have implemented
a filter within MonALISA, customizing these actions. Data received
by providers is condensed into one data entry, and further on, both
provider and version manager data are sent to a distributed storage
and processing system. Information from a specific client is stati-
cally mapped to be sent each time to the same processing node, en-
suring that there is one node containing the complete information
about that user.
The data processing layer could be considered as a distributed intro-
spection layer, but it also integrates continuous processing of the
data available here. It is a system that could itself be divided into 3
sub-layers, at each node level. First, there is one that stores all the
data coming fromMonALISA into some specific tables, without any
kind of processing of the information. The second one updates a ta-
ble periodically where it tries to condense information from the pre-
vious one, by creating a single entry into a table, with both version
manager data and providers’ data. The last sub-layer encapsulates
a per-user history updated periodically with respect to the number
of correct and incorrect operations performed.
The user accounting module is located on another node than the ones pro-
cessing the data. It gathers data from all the nodes and it attributes a
score to each of the clients in the history. Updates are done periodically.
It also allows a client module to connect to it and request the computed
list at any time.
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4 Distributed monitoring system components
Figure 5: Distributed monitoring system infrastructure
4.1 Instrumentation layer
BlobSeer is instrumented using the ApMon library. The routines provided by
the library handle the encoding of the monitoring data in the XDR represen-
tation and the building and sending of the UDP datagrams. As shown in Fig-
ure 6, the applications can use the API to send any specific parameter values to
one or more MonALISA services.
Figure 6: Collecting monitoring data from BlobSeer
4.1.1 Provider level
BlobSeer providers have the ability to have listeners attached, so in order
to add ApMon support to BlobSeer, the monitoring_listener class was imple-
mented. Each of the listeners’ update method is called when a read or write
operation is performed, and so it is reported to the monitoring system. The
values sent are encoded within a string and separated by the “ # ” character, as
shown in Figure 8.
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#include "ApMon.h"
ApMon ∗apm = new ApMon(ConﬁgFile);
...
apm −> sendParameter("MyParameterGroup", "NodeName",
"MyParameter", XDR_REAL64, (char ∗)&value);
...
Figure 7: Instrumenting a code with the ApMon Library
ss<<range−>id<<"#"<<range−>oﬀset<<"#"<<range−>version<<"#"
<<params.get<3>()<<"#"<<now;
buf = ss.str();
apmon−>sendParameter("Blob_IO", NULL, "provider_write", XDR_STRING,
const_cast<char∗>(buf.c_str()));
Figure 8: Sending monitored parameters on provider side
The parameters sent are the following: client hostname, timestamp, blob id,
MonALISA farm name, node name, page size, index of the current page within
a write and the watermark we discussed earlier in this paper.
4.1.2 Version manager level
The versionmanager is alsomonitored. AnApMon-based daemon runs in par-
allel, and parses its log ?le each time it is updated, in order to report the written
page ranges and their associated versions. Whenever this daemon detects that
a new blob or version is created, it sends this information to the MonALISA
service it is configured for. In order for this approach to be consistent, we rely
on a specific format of the log file.
The parameters collected from the log and sent are the following: client
hostname, timestamp, blob id, watermark, blob version, page size, write size
and write offset within the blob.
In order to configure ApMon, we need to set the destination hosts to which
it will send data in a special file, in our case, a monitor.conf file, together with
some other additional parameters, such as maximummessage rate or the inter-
val between datagrams. MonALISA also has to have ApMon support enabled
(in the ‹FarmName ›.conf properties file), as shown in Figure 9.
4.2 Monitoring layer - The MonALISA Filter
Once the data we are interested in reaches MonALISA, it has to be processed
in a custom manner, and sent further to a set of specified hosts. This is why
we have chosen to implement a filter at its level. A filter is a monitoring mod-
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# the ABping module
# ∗ABPing{monABPing, localhost, "␣"}
^monXDRUDP{ParamTimeout=900,NodeTimeout=900,ClusterTimeout=900,
ListenPort=8884}%20
Figure 9: Enabling ApMon support on MonALISA
ule dynamically loadable at service startup that instantiates some predefined
methods when receiving data it is interested in. Our class is called BsMonFilter,
and in order to use it as a MonALISA filter, it has the following structure and
properties:
• It must extend lia.Monitor.Filters.GenericMLFilter
• It must have a constructor with a String param (the FarmName) in which
you must call super(farmName). This constructor is used to dynamically
instantiate the filter at runtime
• Our filter has 4 configuration parameters, that must be set in the
ml.properties file of MonALISA:
– BSMonFilter.ConfigFile - contains the values of the PREDICATES pa-
rameters that must be set by the user. It specifies a list of pred-
icates to filter a desired set of results, in the following format:
F/C/N/Param1|Param2|...|Paramn, where:
* F - Farm Name
* C - Cluster Name
* N - Node Name
* Param_x - Param Name
– BSMonFilter.nodeFile - the path to a text file containing the list of
nodes to which the monitoring data will be sent for processing. The
format of the file must be "hostname port" on each line. The filter
acts as a client to those nodes and will try to connect to them on the
given port.
– BSMonFilter.Port - the default port on which to connect to the nodes
in the nodefile, in case no port is specified for one or more hosts.
– BSMonFilter.filterTimeout - the delay between sending the monitor-
ing data to processing nodes
• The filter must override the following methods:
– public String getName() - returns the Filter name. It is a short name to
identify data sent by the filter in the client. It is also used by Mon-
ALISA clients to inform the Service that they are interested in the
data processed by this filter. It must be unique because all the filters
in ML are identified by their name. Our filter’s name is BsMonFilter.
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– public monPredicate[] getFilterPred() - returns a vector of monPredi-
cate(s). These predicates are used to filter only the interested re-
sults that they want to receive from the entire data flow. If it re-
turns null, the filter will receive all the monitoring information.
In our case, because we are only interested in the WRITE opera-
tion, we have set the PREDICATES property in the file specified
in BSMonFilter.ConfigFile to filter parameters received from any
farm and node, in the group Blob_IO parameter provider_write, and
in the group VManager parameter blobWrite: PREDICATES =
∗/Blob_IO/ ∗ /provider_write; ∗/VManager/ ∗ /blobWrite
– public void notifyResult(Object o) - This method is called every time
a Result matches a predicate defined above. The Filter could save
this in a local buffer for future analysis, or it can take some real time
decision(s)/action(s) if it is a trigger.
– public Object expressResults() - Thismethod is called from time to time
to let the filter process the data that it has received. It should return a
Vector of eResults classes that will be further sent to all the registered
clients, or null if no data should be sent to Clients.
– public long getSleepTime() - returns a time(in milliseconds) for how
often expressResults() should be called. In our case, it returns the
value configured in the ml.properties file.
• In the ml.properties file, the path to the directory where the filter
has its .class file must be added. The parameter that must be de-
fined is lia.Monitor.CLASSURLs, and if there are more filters/directo-
ries they have to be separated by commas. The trailing "/" on the end
of each of the paths is essential; the class will fail to load without it.
lia.Monitor.CLASSURLs = f ile : ${path to BsMonFilter.class f ile}/
• Also, in the ml.properties one must specify what filters should be loaded:
lia.Monitor.ExternalFilters = processing. f ilters.BSMonFilter
Our filter does the following:
• First, it loads its configuration from the required parameters. It initializes
the variables specified theml.properties file, it reads the list of nodes from
the nodefile, and it initializes the parsing predicates values.
• Based on the predicates we defined, it receives only the strings of data
that we are sending from the BlobSeer entities.
• Within the notifyResult method, results are parsed and are stored within
special data classes until the timeout for the expressResults method ex-
pires. In case several provider pages of the same write arrive before an
expressResults is called, the pages are aggregated within a same data
class.
• When the timeout expires, all the data kept in the cache is sent to the
configured nodes, attributing each new client a node - using an algorithm
that has the same results on each MonALISA node. In this way, data
coming from one client is always sent to the same node, in a serialized
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Figure 10: Architecture of a data processing node
manner. All of theMonALISA services used within the deployment must
be configured in the same way (same configuration file).
4.3 Data processing layer
The data processing layer is itself structured into 3 sub-layers, each with spe-
cific roles within the system. We use this 3-step processing to both store the
data we receive from MonALISA and to process it extracting information re-
lated to the behavior of the clients within the system.
First, we handle storing all the data that we receive. This can be used fur-
ther in any kind of situation where we need information about BlobSeer oper-
ations and client activity related to those. Next, we introduced an intermediate
layer that summarizes the information received previously. The results are also
stored into the database, in a single table on each node. The final layer sum-
marizes the number and type of operations per each user. This is the final
abstraction we use about user activity, and the information held here are used
further within the user accounting module.
4.3.1 Storing monitoring data
For each node, the components of the first layer, which stores all the data re-
ceived, are the following:
• The database stored on each node
• A running Java Nio Server
• The process that updates entries in the database
Database On each node, we have one running Postgres database server. The
database contains the following tables:
RR n° 7436
Distributed Monitoring for BlobSeer 20
Figure 11: Data processing layer 1 - Storing data components
• vmanager_writes_client - this table is created one per node. It contains all
the data received from the version manager monitoring side. We have
chosen this approach because the data sent for each client write consists
in maximum one entry in the table (no entry in case of a WNP malicious
client). In this way, we consider the amount of data can be of a reasonable
size such as to fit without significant performance impact into one table.
The structure of the table is as follows:
client_id blob_id version watermark blob_offset write_size page_size timestamp
127.0.0.1 1 148 1250216125 0 1024 1024 1263136394497
127.0.0.1 1 149 1338336333 0 2048 1024 1263136554517
127.0.0.1 1 151 3234340499 0 1024 1024 1263136786556
Table 1: vmanager_writes_client table layout
• summary_table - this table is used in the next level of processing and we
will discuss it there
• provider_writes_client_<clientID> - this table is created one per each client.
It contains data received on the node about a certain client’s writes on
providers. We have chosen this approach because the number of pages
within a write can be significant, and performing several writes by the
same client has the potential to generate a large number of entries that
need to be stored in the database. From the point of view of querying the
database, it is more efficient to have this amount of information already
grouped by some criteria (in our case, one table per client ID) rather than
storing it in a single table. Querying several smaller tables is more effi-
cient than retrieving it from one huge one. The structure of the table is as
follows:
Nio Server The server is a Java process using features of the NIO (non-
blocking I/O) library. It runs on a separate thread and it listens for connec-
tions on a user-specified port. Its implementation is based on the NIO tutorial
located at http://rox-xmlrpc.sourceforge.net/niotut/ . The connection
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blob_id timestamp farm node watermark page_index page_number page_size
1 1263136275142 Michi-IRISA paralapeche 1372071065 0 1 1024
1 1263136534513 Michi-IRISA paralapeche 3830431616 0 1 1024
1 1263138869310 Michi-IRISA paralapeche 1201352078 0 1 1024
1 1263138969259 Michi-IRISA paralapeche 227310002 0 2 1024
Table 2: provider_writes_client_<clientID> table layout
with the servers on the nodes is initiated by the MonALISA filter. Once the
server accepts a connection and receives data on it, the request type is parsed
and action is taken accordingly. Figure ?? shows the class diagram illustrating
the interactions in which the server class takes part. There are 2 request types
that we accept:
• Process monitoring data - upon receiving such a request, the server
passes it to the 1st layer processing thread. Data is deserialized and put
into a queue, from where the thread picks it up. This kind of request
doesn’t receive a response from the server.
• Gather user information - this request is served by the final processing
layer, and it sends the list containing the summary information computed
up to that point about each client’s activity.
Processing thread The processing thread removes data from the server
queue, and depending on its type, it inserts it into one of the tables described
above. It also keeps a list of the updated clients, where it inserts client IDs
whose information has been added into the database, and the timestamp at
which the update was performed. This way, the next layer thread can only run
its processing only on clients whose information has been updated, selecting
the corresponding entries from the database.
4.3.2 Creating a summary of received monitoring data
The next step in obtaining the user activity information for user accounting is
creating a summary of the large amount of information we expect to receive
and store in the previous step. We need this because we finally want to ob-
tain a small amount of information associated with each client, but that will
characterize entirely its activity within BlobSeer.
The summary thread works as a timer task, executing its run() method at
a specified time interval. Based on the updated clients cache collected within
the previous step, we select the new entries inserted into the database for those
specific client IDs. We keep a reference timestamp that we update for every
timer tick. Because we run all the processing threads on the same node, the
time reference will be the same, and we can compare the current timestamps
with those in the table entries. Once the new information is obtained, we it-
erate through it and create one single entry per client write, comprising both
provider data (all the pages that arrived from that write until that timestamp)
and version manager data. This doesn’t mean that we will only have one table
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Figure 12: Data processing layer 2 - Creating a summary of the received data
entry per write, as some of the write data (such as part of the pages or version
information) might arrive at a later time than other ones, and the timer interval
might expire in the process. In a write-intensive scenario this kind of behavior
is actually to be expected.
Within this thread, the summary_table information is filled. Its layout is the
following:
client_id timestamp blob_id watermark provider_pages write_size _vman page_size
127.0.0.1 1263136281634 1 1372071065 1 0 1024
127.0.0.1 1263136401665 1 1250216125 2 2048 1024
127.0.0.1 1263136541695 1 3830431616 1 0 1024
Table 3: summary_table layout
A schematic of the interactions taking place at this level is depicted in Fig-
ure 12.
4.3.3 Computing client history
Our final layer abstracts into more general user activity information the data
contained up to that point about a user in the system. This thread also has a
timer attached, running periodically and each time updating a cache contain-
ing information about all the clients whose data is stored on the node.
The cache data associated with a client has the following entries:
• Number of IW writes
• Number of PNWwrites
• Number of WNP writes
• Number of normal operations performed by the client
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Figure 13: Data processing layer 3 - How the client history is being computed
Before information new information is added to the cache, every operation
is put on hold for a preconfigured period of time. We do this in case more
information about that same operationmay not arrive to the node all at once. In
keeping data about a write pending for 3-5 seconds, we give all the information
time to arrive within a reasonable interval and we prevent a correct operation
from being classified as a different type.
The algorithm repeating for each timer tick is the following:
• The timestamp corresponding to the end of the operation are saved
• The entries with a timestamp newer than the last update time are selected
from the summary_table
• For each newWRITE operation:
– In case information some about this WRITE was already in our
pending list, we update the pending entry with the additional in-
formation, but keeping the original expiry time.
– If the information is not in the pending list, we update its timestamp
to know when it was introduced, and we add it.
• Next, for each operation in the pending list, we check to see if it has ex-
pired. If that’s the case, we check the type of the WRITE based on the
size written to providers and that reported to the versionmanager: PNW,
WNP, IW or a normal operation.
• If we already have an entry for this client in our cache, we update it. If
we don’t, we create a new object for the entry associated with this client
ID.
In addition to that, it is this level that supplies information about client
activity to the user accountingmodule. When the NIO server receives a request
for collecting client activity data, it passes it to this thread, which serializes all
the cache data and sends them back to the requester through the server’s send
method.
Figure 13 displays a summary of the processing taking place at this level.
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4.4 User accounting - Computing malicious clients list
The module computing the malicious users list runs on a separate node, and
uses the information about BlobSeer clients’ activity gathered within the mon-
itoring system. It consists of 2 running threads :
• Nio server thread - it is the same as for the distributed processing nodes.
Its role is to listen for connections, to interpret requests and to pass them
on to the other thread.
• Timer update thread - it has the role of periodically computing a list of
malicious users, the black list we are interested in for our user account-
ing actions. This thread also receives as an argument the list of nodes that
store the BlobSeer monitoring information, the same one that the Mon-
ALISA filter uses.
– Every time the timer expires, it tries to connect to each one of them
and request the data contained in each of the caches.
– The connection is initiated as blocking, because we need the results
at the precise time we initiate the request, but with a timeout, in case
one of the nodes dies or fails to connect for some reason.
– As new data is received, the information is added to a global cache
list maintained at this level.
– After all the nodes are interrogated, we iterate through the com-
puted global cache, we check each client’s activity and, in case it
contains some suspected operations, we add its ID to the black list
computed.
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5 Conclusion
5.1 Contribution
In this paper, we present our approach toward creating an efficient user ac-
counting system for BlobSeer, based on monitoring. Our solution relies on a
distributed architecture, and it offers an efficient mechanism for both moni-
toring, storing and processing the data related to user activity. The user ac-
counting module is independent of the monitoring part, ensuring that the data
received there could also be used for other purposes.
The goals of the paper were to use the set of specific data that can be col-
lected from BlobSeer, and create a system processing them in an online manner,
so as to provide an almost real-time image of the user activity in the system.
We argue that our distributed processing system has no significant impact on
BlobSeer performance and that it can be a viable alternative in implementing
security policies within.
We proposed the use of multiple MonALISA services that share the load
of collecting the data from the providers, and we implemented filters for this
data at the service level. This way, data within a single WRITE is aggregated,
in order to reduce in size the network traffic.
Because of the distribution algorithm at the filter level, data about one client
is always sent to the same node. This is essential to the good working of the
system; otherwise the client might be reported as malicious inconsistently. Our
3-layered distributed data processing system is a fast way of compressing and
storing the data received.
The module computing the malicious clients is tuned for interacting with
the processing system and gathering information about the clients from all the
nodes.
5.2 Future work
The gathered user accounting can be the starting point towards an implement-
ing a self- adaptation or a security mechanism for BlobSeer. A possible next
step would be the implementation of the self-adaptation engine within Blob-
Seer, in such a way that the users determined as malicious to be notified to the
provider manager. In case it receives further write requests from such users, it
can block them by not returning the list of providers on which they can write
data. We can also use the detection of malicious WRITEs to invalidate certain
blobs or versions affected by such writes.
A more advanced mechanism concerning security within BlobSeer could
involve the implementation of access rights on blobs in such a way that only
part of the users are credited to access certain information. Also, we envision
that users cand be offered different levels of quality of service. For example, we
could allocate storage space and bandwidth differently based on a trust level
that the user must gain during his activity within the system.
One of the improvements that the current system could benefit fromwould
be a higher distribution degree of the processing that computes the black lists.
The user scores could be computed in a distributed way, so that the module
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gathering the data has less computing to do and that the whole process would
take less time.
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